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DIVORCE-ALIMONY, ALLOWANCES, AND DISPOSITION OF
PROPERTY-ABUSE OF DISCRETION-THE UNCONSCIONABLE
STIPULATED DIVORCE AGREEMENT AND RULE 60(b)(vi):
WHAT ABOUT THE CHILDREN?
Crawford v. Crawford, 524 N.W.2d 833 (N.D. 1994)
I. FACTS
In March, 1993, Plaintiff-Appellee, Kenneth Crawford (Kenneth)
filed for divorce from his wife, Leslie Crawford (Leslie).' Kenneth and
Leslie had been married since 1978 and had four children. 2  During
their fourteen years of marriage, Kenneth completed his medical educa-
tion, internships, and residency in Grand Forks, North Dakota. 3 Leslie
was diagnosed with having a brain tumor in November 1990.4-The
subsequent surgery was successful and Leslie went on to complete a
Bachelor of Arts Degree in Social Sciences in 1992 at the University of
North Dakota. 5 Kenneth accepted a position with the Pembina County
Hospital and moved the family from Grand Forks to Cavalier, North
Dakota, in December 1992.6 Kenneth and Leslie purchased a home in
Cavalier.7
After filing for divorce, Kenneth moved into a rental apartment. 8
Leslie remained in the home with the children until June 1993.9 Ken-
neth received a Notice Before Foreclosure in June 1993, and told Leslie
that there was a danger of losing the house.10 For this reason, Kenneth
moved back into the home and took custody of the children, and Leslie
went to live in Kenneth's apartment."l
I. Appellant's Brief at 2, Crawford v. Crawford, 524 N.W.2d 833 (N.D. 1994) (No. 940080).
2. Crawford v. Crawford, 524 N.W.2d 833, 834 (N.D. 1994).
3. Brief for the Appellee at 1, Crawford (No. 940080).
4. Appellant's Brief at 3. Crawford (No. 940080).
5. Id. at l, 3.




10. Appellant's Brief at 2, Crawford (No. 940080).
1 1. Crawford, 524 N.W.2d at 834. Leslie explains why she moved into Kenneth's apartment:
"Kenneth came to me and convinced me to move from our marital home. He convinced
my [sic] by telling me that we had received a Notice of Foreclosure and that if I did not
move so that he could live in the home and pay the bills, we would lose our home as well
as our vehicle.
"I believed him. I saw no other alternative. The foremost thought in my mind was for
my children to remain in their home. As a child, I never experienced a permanent home
and neither had my children.
"I wanted to assure that they could remain in their home and believed the only way to
achieve that would be for Kenneth to move into the home."
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Originally, Leslie had retained counsel for the divorce, 12 but prior to
the final proceedings, she dismissed her attorney1 3 and entered into a
stipulated agreement with Kenneth without benefit of counsel. 14 The
stipulation agreement awarded their home and custody of all four
children to Kenneth.' 5 "Leslie was given visitation rights and ordered to
pay $15 per month in child support."16 At the time of the divorce,
Kenneth was earning $130,000 per year as a physician, and Leslie was
employed at a local grocery store as a meat wrapper earning $300 per
month.17
At the divorce hearing,18 Leslie indicated to the district judge that
she agreed, voluntarily and of her own free will, to the terms of the
stipulation.1 9 The trial court found that the stipulated agreement was
valid, and entered the terms of the agreement into the judgment.20
Five months after the divorce judgment was entered, Leslie retained
an attorney and filed a motion under Rule 60(b) of the North Dakota
Rules of Civil Procedure, 2 1 which allows a party to vacate and obtain
relief from a final judgment.22 Leslie's Rule 60(b) motion alleged that
there was newly discovered evidence. 23 In support of her motion, Leslie
12. Brief for the Appellee at 1, Crawford (No. 940080).
13. Id. at 3. Leslie's attorney advised her against proceeding without counsel. Id. Leslie
informed her attorney that she and her husband had come to an agreement concerning the disposition
of the property and she no longer required any legal representation. J.A. at D2, Crawford (No.
940080). It was the opinion of Leslie's attorney that she lacked the capacity to fully understand .the
legal ramifications of her signing a separation agreement. Id. at D3.
14. Brief for the Appellee at 3-4, Crawford (No. 940080).
15. Crawford, 524 N.W.2d at 835.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 834. North Dakota "child support guidelines are based upon the obligor income model.
Consequently, Leslie's income was relevant for determining her support obligation. However, the
guidelines did not require disclosure of Kenneth's income, because Kenneth, as the custodial spouse
under the stipulation, was not obligated to make support payments." Id. at 835 n.l.
18. Brief for the Appellee at 4, Crawford (No. 940080).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Crawford, 524 N.W.2d at 835.
22. Rule 60 provides relief from judgment or order, and section (b) states that:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's
legal representative from a final judgment or order in any action or proceeding for the
following reasons:
(i) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(ii) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(iii) fraud (whether denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation,
or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(iv) the judgment is void;
(v) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a previous
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed oi otherwise vacated, or
it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; or
(vi) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
N.D. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
23. Brief for the Appellee at 4-5, Crawford (No. 940080). A motion for a new trial can be made
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filed an affidavit stating that she was coerced into signing the stipulation
and that the brain tumor operation in 1990 rendered her incapable of
fully understanding the legal effect of the stipulation. 24 Leslie also
alleged that Kenneth used fraud and coercion to take advantage of her
reduced mental capacity during the formation of the stipulation
agreement .25
On January 19, 1994, a hearing was held on the evidence relevant to
the Rule 60 motion. 26 The trial judge felt that Leslie had asked thought-
ful questions at the divorce hearing and recognized the legal ramifica-
tions of the stipulated agreement. 27 The trial court found no medical
evidence to indicate any incapacitation or memory lapses. 28 In addition,
there was no evidence that Kenneth had used fraud, deceit, coercion, or
misrepresentation, to induce Leslie into signing the stipulation.2 9 The
trial court found no extraordinary circumstances which would warrant
the reopening of the case since Leslie knowingly and willingly entered
into the stipulation. 30 Thus, the trial court denied Leslie's Rule 60(b)
motion for a relief of judgment. 31
Subsequently, the case was brought before the North Dakota
Supreme Court who reversed and remanded the case. 32 The court held,
in a 3-2 decision, that the stipulation agreement was so one-sided that it
was unconscionable. 33 The Court relied on Rule 60(b)(vi) of the North
Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure 34 which allows the court to vacate the
stipulated divorce agreement in order to "accomplish justice."35
II. LEGAL HISTORY
"The problem of when to allow relief from a civil judgment after
the time for an appeal has run is one that has plagued courts and rule-
makers since the beginning of court systems." 36 "Typically, American
within six months of entry of judgment, upon the ground of newly discovered evidence, under N.D. R.
Civ. P. 59(c)(1).
24. Crawford, 524 N.W.2d at 835.
25. Brief for the Appellee at 6, Crawford (No. 940080).
26. Id. at 5.
27. Id. at 4.
28. Crawford, 524 N.W.2d at 835. Leslie could not provide the trial court with any medical
testimony or evidence to substantiate her claim of a diminished mental capacity as a result of the brain
tumor surgery. Brief for the Appellee at 6, Crawford (No. 940080).
29. Crawford, 524 N.W.2d at 835.
30. Brief for the Appellee at 5, Crawford (No. 940080). Leslie was given opportunities to have
her own counsel review the stipulation, but made it clear that she wished to proceed without counsel.
Id.
31. Id.
32. Crawford, 524 N.W.2d at 836.
33. Id. at 835.
34. N.D. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(vi).
35. Crawford, 524 N.W.2d at 836 (quoting Kinsella v. Kinsella, 181 N.W.2d 764, 769 (N.D.
1970)).
36. Mary Kay Kane, Relief from Federal Judgments: A Morass Unrelieved by a Rule, 30
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courts have placed finality before truth in the hierarchy of values." 3 7
Since 1948, Rule 60(b) provided litigants with six principal methods to
reopen final judgments.38 This comment deals with clause six, arguably
"[t]he most controversial provision" of Rule 60(b),39 and its application
to stipulated divorce agreements.
A. FEDERAL INTERPRETATION OF RULE 60(B)(VI)
Historically, the Federal Court System has not applied Rule 60(b)
(vi) absent extraordinary circumstances, even though relief from the
judgment might have been obtained had an appeal been taken.40 The
requirement of extraordinary circumstances to justify reopening a
judgment was first developed by the United States Supreme Court in
1949 in Klapprott v. United States .41 Klapprott involved an action to set
aside a four-year-old default judgment that had canceled the petitioner's
certificate of naturalization on the ground that the certificate had been
obtained fraudulently. 42 Klapprott, a German citizen, was in jail for
conspiracy in violation of the Selective Service Act, and was thus unable
to attend his denaturalization proceeding. 43 In setting aside the judg-
ment, the Court found that clause six was applicable, noting that
Klapprott was entitled to a fair hearing. 44 Clause six was seen as a
residual clause to cover unforeseen contingencies, and as such it was
intended to be a means for accomplishing justice in exceptional situa-
tions; and, so confined, did not violate the principles of finality of
judgments .45
HASTINGS LJ. 41,41 (1978) (footnote omitted).
An early English statute dealing with judgments provided that any judgment entered from
the assizes should in no way be amended or altered. II Henry 4. ch. 3 (1409) (Eng.).
Provision for some relief was made in later centuries through the use of various writs.
The issue whether relief was warranted in a given case, however, remained an
important and difficult one. See, e.g., Cannan v. Reynolds, 119 Eng. Rep. 493 (K.B.
1855).
Id. at 41 n.2.
37. Id. at 41. But see FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.2 (2d
ed. 1977) (noting that "modem procedure gives greater weight" to fully developing the evidentiary
possibilities and contentions of the parties).
38. N.D. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
39. Kane, supra note 36, at 43 (discussing Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and general observations and problems associated with Rule 60(b)).
40. 7 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 60.27[1] (2d ed. 1983) (citing
Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 (1950); In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., 391 F.2d 163 (3d
Cir. 1968); Stewart Sec. Corp. v. Guaranty Trust Co., 71 F.R.D. 32 (W.D. Okla. 1976)).
41. 335 U.S. 601 (1949); see Kane, supra note 36, at 50 (noting that extraordinary circum-
stances requirement began with Klapprott).
42. Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601,602-03 (1949).
43. Id. at 604-08.
44. Id. at 615.
45. Id. at 614-15; see 7 MOORE, supra note 40, 5 60.27[2].
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One year later, the United States Supreme Court dealt with precisely
the same subject matter in Ackermann v. United States.46 In another
denaturalization judgment, Mr. and Mrs. Ackermann did not appeal an
adverse judgment due to the cost involved. 4 7 At the same time, Mrs.
Ackermann's brother, Mr. Keilbar, under the same charges, appealed to
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and prevailed. 48 The Ackermanns
filed a motion under clause six for a relief from judgment, asserting
"that the denaturalization judgment was erroneous." 4 9 The Supreme
Court denied the motion for relief and affirmed the lower court's
decision.50 Comparing Ackermann to Klapprott, the Court found that
Mr. and Mrs. Ackermann had been given a free choice to appeal their
case and were represented by competent counsel, unlike the situation in
Klapprott.51 Therefore, the purported excuse for not appealing the judg-
ment was not so extraordinary as to bring Ackermann within Klapprott
or clause six.
52
The United States Supreme Court has struggled with the question of
truth or finality of judgment, and how to employ and limit clause six. 5 3
The Court in Ackermann made it clear that, although the lower court
ruling was erroneous, finality must control, stating that "[t]here must be
an end to litigation someday, and free, calculated, deliberate choices are
not to be relieved from." 5 4 Drawing on this language and the limited
number of "extraordinary circumstances," federal courts have focused
on whether a fair and deliberate choice has been made. 55 Thus, despite
46. 340 U.S. 193, 196 (1950); see also Kane, supra note 36, at 52 (comparing Klapprott to
Ackerman).
47. Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 196 (1950).
48. id. at 195; Keilbar v. United States, 144 F.2d 866, 866 (5th Cir. 1944) (per curiam) (dismissing
the case on its merits).
49. Ackermann, 340 U.S. at 197.
50. Id. at 202.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. For a view of the federal court's use of Rule 60(b)(vi), see Loucke v. United States which
states:
[T]his rule was not designed to supersede the normal and ordinary channels of relief.
Nor was it intended to invest the court with an omnipotence whose boundary is defined
only by the court's conscience. Considerations of judicial administration and of the
stability of the law no less than the obligation of doing individual equity must be balanced
and adjusted.
21 F.R.D. 305, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
54. Ackermann, 340 U.S. at 198; see also Atkinson v. Prudential Property Co., 43 F.3d 367, 373
(8th Cir. 1994) (holding that exceptional circumstances are relevant only when there is inadequate
redress, not every time a party has suffered unfavorable consequences as a result of a judgment); 3
BARRON AND HoLTzOFF, FEDERAL PRACrIcE AND PROCEDURE § 2864, at 359 (Charles Allan Wright et al.,
eds. 1982) (stating that the power of clause six does not relieve a party of free, calculated and
deliberate choices).
55. See Romania v. Wildenstein & Co., 147 F.R.D. 62,66 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that Romania
failed to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances in not complying with discovery procedures; but
that Romania's actions's were deliberate litigation strategy); see also DeLong's, Inc. v. Stupp Bros.
Bridge & Iron Co., 40 F.R.D. 127, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (refusing to grant relief to plaintiff who had
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the use of clause six, litigants still have a duty to take proper steps to
protect their legal interests.56
Although the United States Supreme Court has not dealt directly
with the question of extraordinary circumstances in a divorce settlement,
the Court in Klapprott57 emphasized the grave consequences of deporta-
tion which may require the use of clause six, as opposed to a divorce or
default judgment involving simply money. 58 Thus, the federal courts are
more likely to apply clause six in cases that require justice for persons
who are being deprived of a fundamental constitutional right where the
consequences of that depravation are extraordinarily severe or unfairly
rendered.
B. NORTH DAKOTA INTERPRETATION OF RULE 60(B)(VI)
Rule 60(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, relief
from judgment or order, is modeled after Rule 60(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 59 Over the past thirty years, the North Dakota
Supreme Court has refined its definition of an extraordinary circum-
stance relating to a stipulated divorce agreement. On several occasions,
the court has relied upon federal rulings regarding civil procedure when
the applicable rules are identical. 60
In 1966, the North Dakota Supreme Court dealt with the issue of an
extraordinary circumstance relating to a divorce agreement and Rule
60(b) in Zundel v. Zundel.61 In this case, Mr. Zundel filed a Rule 60(b)
motion to vacate a previous stipulated divorce agreement, alleging at that
time he was incompetent and unable to understand the divorce pro-
ceedings. 62 Mr. Zundel filed several medical affidavits from two doctors
to support this motion. 63 The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded
that Mr. Zundel did not exhibit any form of mental incapacitation
during the divorce proceedings and noted that he was represented by
adequate counsel. 64  The court stated that the judgment would be
made a calculated choice to dismiss two defendants in order to gain an earlier trial setting).
56. 3 BARRON & HoLTzoFF, supra note 54, § 2864, at 359.
57. 335 U.S. 601 (1949).
58. Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601,611-12 (1949).
59. N.D.R. C iv. P. 60(b)(vi). "Rule 60 is nearly identical to Rule 60, FRCivP, except for minor
changes to conform to the court system of North Dakota and addition of a provision to subdivision (b)
regarding obtaining leave from an appellate court to make a motion for relief." N.D. Civ. P. 60(b)
(explanatory note).
60. See, e.g., Zundel v. Zundel, 146 N.W.2d 896, 901 (N.D. 1966) (citing Erick Rios Bridoux v.
Eastern Air Lines, 214 F.2d 207, 210 (3d Cir. 1954), and holding that the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to set aside a default judgment for defendant that was not properly represented
by counsel) (other citations omitted).
61. 146 N.W.2d 896 (N.D. 1966).
62. Zundel v. Zundel, 146 N.W.2d 896, 898 (N.D. 1966). At the time of the divorce, Mr. Zundel
was on a prescribed dosage of Valium. Id. at 902.
63. Id. at 898-99.
64. Id. at 900.
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disturbed only if there was an abuse of discretion by the trial court. 65
Finding that Mr. Zundel had exercised a deliberate choice entering into
a stipulated agreement, he was thus precluded from any claim of
extraordinary circumstance.66
In a decision following Zundel, the North Dakota Supreme Court
did allow a motion to vacate under clause six in Kinsella v. Kinsella.67 In
a hearing which neither Mrs. Kinsella nor her attorney attended,68 the
trial court terminated child support payments that were past due, as well
as future support for her and her child, thus modifying a prior 1956
divorce agreement made by the parties. 69 Mrs. Kinsella motioned to
vacate the order under Rule 60(b)(vi) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil
Procedure, stating that if the default judgment was permitted to stand, her
minor daughter would suffer.70 In vacating the prior decision, the court
expressed its concern for the welfare of the child and emphasized that a
father's duty to support his children is continuous. 7 1  The court in
Kinsella stated that clause six should be liberally construed and applied
because of its remedial nature. 72 Applying clause six, the court vacated
the judgment to protect the interests of the child's welfare. 73 The con-
cern shown in Kinsella for the interest of the child could infer that the
welfare of the child in a divorce action might rise to the level of an extra-
ordinary circumstance within the meaning of Klapprott and Ackermann.
Although Rule 60(b) does provide a means to vacate a judgment
when an extraordinary circumstance exists, courts in North Dakota have
generally used the rule in conjunction with contract law to vacate stipu-
65. Id. at 901.
66. Id.; see Horace v. St. Louis S.W. R.R. Co., 489 F.2d 632, 633 (8th Cir. 1974) (stating that Rule
60(b) provides for extraordinary relief which may be granted only on an adequate showing of
exceptional circumstances); Lubben v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d 645, 651 (1st
Cir. 1972) (holding that Rule 60(b)(vi) is not a substitute for an appeal, but should be used as a residual
clause only where exceptional circumstances exist); Rinieri v. News Syndicate Co., 385 F.2d 818, 822
(2d Cir. 1967) (stating that "trial judges must be allowed to exercise their sound discretion in granting
or denying relief from a final judgment"); Berryhill v. United States, 199 F.2d 217,219 (6th Cir. 1952)
(noting that "a change in the judicial view of the applicable law, after a final judgment, is not a basis
for vacating a judgment entered before announcement of the change"); Loucke v. United States, 21
F.R.D. 305, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (authorizing relief under Rule 60(b) may not be justified where the
party failed to appeal prior adjudication due to lack of financial means).
67. 181 N.W.2d 764 (N.D. 1970).
68. Kinsella v. Kinsella, 181 N.W.2d 764, 766 (N.D. 1970). At the time of the hearing in Cass
County District Court, Mrs. Kinsella was living in California. Id.
69. Id. at 766-67.
70. Id. at 769.
71. Id.
72. Id.; see Sioux Falls Constr. Co. v. Dakota Flooring, 109 N.W.2d 244,247 (N.D. 1961) (holding
that Rule 60(b) providing for relief from default judgment is remedial in nature and should be liberally
construed).
73. Kinsella, 181 N.W.2d at 769. For further cases where a Rule 60(b)(vi) motion was granted,
see, for example, Brakke v. Brakke, 525 N.W.2d 687, 690 (N.D. 1994) (citing Crawford v. Crawford,
524 N.W.2d 833 (1994), and holding a motion for relief under Rule 60(b)(vi) was timely), and In re
Braun, 145 N.W.2d 482, 484 (N.D. 1966) (holding Rule 60(b)(vi) should be invoked for the best
interest of the minor).
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lated agreements. 74 For example, in Galloway v. Galloway75 the North
Dakota Supreme Court dealt with the competency of marital parties to
contract.76 Mrs. Galloway was an alcoholic who agreed to give custody
of their minor children and most of the marital property to her husband,
an attorney. 77 The court vacated the stipulated agreement under clause
six, holding that where the competency of one of the spouses is a signifi-
cant element in suits for divorce, any settlement agreement should be
thoroughly scrutinized before it is accepted by the trial court.78 Thus,
combining Mrs. Galloway's incompetency with the Rule 60(b)(vi)
motion, the court vacated the stipulated agreement relating to contractual
matters of custody, property division and alimony.79
Since the Galloway decision, the. North Dakota Supreme Court has
been reluctant to rewrite valid divorce agreements, absent any statutory
grounds governing rescission, in order to effectuate the parties'
intentions. 80 However, these contracts have been modified regarding
support provisions or alimony when warranted by extraordinary
circumstances.81
Recently, the North Dakota Supreme Court denied a Rule 60(b)(vi)
motion in a divorce proceeding involving a stipulated agreement. 82 In
Clooten v. Clooten,83 a stipulated divorce agreement granted Julie
Clooten the family business, custody of their child and the family home;
Robert Clooten received a vehicle, $25,000, and was ordered to pay child
support.8 4 In denying Mr. Clooten's Rule 60(b) motion, the court relied
on two earlier decisions, Fleck v. Fleck85 and Wolfe v. Wolfe, 86 and
74. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-09-02 (1987) (allowing a party to a contract to rescind if the consent of
the party rescinding was given by mistake or obtained through duress, menace, fraud, or undue
influence exercised by or with the connivance of the party as to whom he rescinds).
75. 281 N.W.2d 804 (N.D. 1979).
76. Galloway v. Galloway, 281 N.W.2d 804,807 (N.D. 1979).
77. Id. at 805.
78. Id. at 807.
79. id.
80. See Wolfe v. Wolfe, 391 N.W.2d 617, 619 (N.D. 1986) (recognizing that when competent
parties have voluntarily stipulated to a disposition of property, a court should not decree a distribution
that is inconsistent with the parties contract); Peterson v. Peterson, 313 N.W.2d 743, 744 (N.D. 1981)
(holding that a court's authority to make a just and equitable distribution of property under N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-05-24, does not allow the court to rewrite a valid written separation agreement absent
statutory grounds for a rescission under N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-09-02).
81. Peterson v. Peterson, 313 N.W.2d 743, 745 & n.8 (N.D. 1981); see Nugent v. Nugent. 152
N.W.2d 323, 331 (N.D. 1967) (distinguishing Sinkler v. Sinkler, 194 N.W. 817 (N.D. 1923)); see also
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24 (1991) (providing permanent alimony and division of property guide-
lines); Kack v. Kack, 169 N.W.2d 111, 113 (N.D. 1969) (holding that where parties enter into a
property settlement agreement, the court, in fixing alimony and support payments and in making
equitable distribution of real and personal property of the parties as part of its decree, is not bound by
provisions of such agreement but may determine whether the agreement as made by the parties is fair,
just, and equitable).
82. See Clooten v. Clooten, 520 N.W.2d 843, 847 (N.D. 1994).
83. 520 N.W.2d 843 (N.D. 1994).
84. Clooten v. Clooten, 520 N.W.2d 843, 845 (N.D. 1994).
85. 337 N.W.2d 786. 790 (N.D. 1983) (denying wife's motion for relief from a divorce judgment
1106
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concluded that the trial court had no duty to investigate the terms of a
valid contractual agreement between the parties. 87  Furthermore, in
recognition of the public policy favoring prompt and peaceful resolu-
tion of disputes in divorce matters, the court in Clooten stated that the
trial court was under no obligation to determine if the agreement was
even objectively fair and equitable. 88 Referring to Fleck, the court found
that even though Robert was not represented by counsel at the time he
entered into the written stipulation, this by itself was not a sufficient
justification for relief.89 The court in Clooten concluded that a party
must show justification for setting aside the agreement under the law of
contracts and that ignorance of the law is not enough to vacate a judg-
ment under Rule 60(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure.90
Notwithstanding the Clooten decision, the North Dakota Supreme
Court has redefined what may qualify for relief under Rule 60(b)
(vi) with regard to stipulated divorce agreements. 91 The inflexibility
and strictness of the Clooten decision was the impetus behind a more
liberal construction and application of Rule 60(b)(vi) in Crawford v.
Crawford.92
III. CASE ANALYSIS
In Crawford, the North Dakota Supreme Court liberally construed
Rule 60(b)(vi) on the basis that the divorce stipulation was
unconscionable. 93 The court examined whether the trial court had
abused its discretion by acting in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or
unconscionable manner. 94 Although Leslie did not file a motion under
clause six to vacate the judgment, the court reversed and remanded on
the disputed issues of spousal maintenance and child custody, relying on
Rule 60(b)(vi) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure.95
under Rule 60(b), holding the stipulated agreement of the divorce should stand barring adequate
statutory grounds for recision).
86. 391 N.W.2d 617, 621 (N.D. 1986) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying husband relief from stipulated divorce agreement under Rule 60(b), since there was no
justification for setting the contract aside).
87. Clooten, 520 N.W.2d at 846.
88. Id. (citing Wolfe v. Wolfe, 391 N.W.2d 617, 620 (N.D. 1986)).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 843; see Crawford v. Crawford, 524 N.W.2d 833, 836 (N.D. 1994) (stating that Rule
60(b)(vi) may be used to vacate a judgment when the court determines that the circumstances
uncovered reveal that the stipulated terms were "rankly" unfair).
92. 524 N.W.2d 833 (N.D. 1994).
93. Crawford v. Crawford, 524 N.W.2d 833, 836 (N.D. 1994).
94. Id. at 835; see also Dvorak v. Dvorak, 329 N.W.2d 868, 870 (N.D. 1983) (defining an abuse
of discretion as an action by the lower court in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner)
(citing Coulter v. Coulter, 328 N.W.2d 232, 238 (N.D. 1982)).
95. Id. at 836.
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Writing for the majority, Justice Levine clarified an earlier statement
made in Wolfe v. Wolfe9 6 regarding an absence of a duty on the trial
court to determine if the terms of a stipulated agreement were objectively
fair and equitable. 97 The court noted that, although adoption of stipulat-
ed agreements is promoted by public policy, there still remains a duty of
the trial court to use its discretion to avoid injustice. 98 Therefore, Rule
60(b)(vi) provided the court with "the ultimate safety valve to avoid
enforcement by vacating a judgment to accomplish justice."99
Justice Levine regarded the stipulated agreement to be so one-sided
that it created an unconscionable hardship on Leslie.100 The court
underscored the importance of not allowing one marital partner to use
the trust inherent in a marriage to take unconscientious advantage over
the other.101 Thus, determining whether or not the parties agreed to the
terms of the stipulated agreement was irrelevant, since upholding the
judgment would damage the reputation of the courts to do justice.102 In
the majority's view, judgments that are unconscionable should be treated
in the same manner as agreements that are illegal.103 Therefore, the
court stated that relief under Rule 60(b)(vi) should be liberally construed
and applied in order to prevent hardship or injustice.' 0 4
Justice Neumann, in a dissenting opinion, stated that absent statutory
grounds for rescission under North Dakota Century Code chapter
9-09,105 the court had no authority to rewrite a valid separation
agreement.' 06 Justice Neumann urged that absent any finding that
96. 391 N.W.2d 617 (N.D. 1986).
97. Crawford, 524 N.W.2d at 835-36; see Wolfe v. Wolfe, 391 N.W.2d 617, 620 (N.D. 1986)
(determining that a trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying husband's motion from relief of
judgment). see also Fleck v. Fleck, 337 N.W. 786, 791-92 (N.D. 1983) (holding that failure to include
in the divorce judgment any findings of fact pertaining to values of property or equities of the parties
was not error where the divorce was not contested, there were no conflicting versions of facts in
regard to division of property, and the parties had reached an agreement on all matters pertaining to
division of property); Peterson v. Peterson, 313 N.W.2d 743, 745 (N.D. 1981) (holding that property
settlement agreement incorporated in divorce decree may not later be modified by trial court if the
agreement is intended to adjust finally all property rights of the parties).
98. Crawford, 524 N.W.2d at 836.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 835.
101. Id. at 836.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. (quoting Cliche v. Cliche, 466 A.2d 314, 316 (Vt. 1983)); see also In re Estate of Jensen,
162 N.W.2d 861, 876 (N.D. 1968) (concluding that the trial court has discretion in vacating a judgment
which will not be disturbed on appeal except for abuse); Sioux Falls Constr. Co. v. Dakota Flooring,
109 N.W.2d 244 (N.D. 1961) (discussing a defendant who received service at the time of pressing
business and just before his wife became seriously ill, causing him to disregard his business affairs.
was entitled to have a default judgment set aside upon showing of a meritorious defense).
105. This chapter provides for the extinction, rescission, alteration, and cancellation of contracts
and obligations. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 9-09 (1987).
106. Crawford, 524 N.W.2d at 836; see Peterson v. Peterson, 313 N.W.2d 743, 745 (N.D. 1981)
(holding that the court's authorization to make a just and equitable distribution of properties does not
allow it to rewrite a valid contract absent statutory grounds governing rescission). The code
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Leslie's consent was given by mistake or obtained through duress,
menace, fraud, or undue influence, the court should not vacate the
judgment.107 Justice Neumann felt the court should confine its decision
to the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining
if there were sufficient grounds for disturbing the finality of judg-
ment. 108 As Justice Neumann noted, the majority decided the case on an
unconscionability standard applied to the underlying stipulated contract
of the parties.109
Although the dissent agreed that the stipulation had left Leslie on
the "very short end of [the] material stick,"l10 absent a de novo review
of the record and overturning prior law, the judgment should stand.I 11
Relying on the fact that the trial court found no coercion by Kenneth, or
medical evidence to show Leslie's mental incapacity, the dissent noted
that it was not up to the court to provide an escape from a free, but
misguided, choice.1 12 Justice Neumann stated that the majority opinion
invites judges to meddle in proposed stipulations to determine what is
fair and right.113
While both the majority and the dissent agreed that the stipulation
agreement was unfair, the majority decision expanded the use of clause
six to include a stipulated divorce agreement that produces an uncon-
scionable effect on one of the parties. Here, the dissent disregarded an
underlying fundamental constitutional right of natural parents in the
care, custody, and management of their children."l 4 Here, the majority
determined that Leslie's bargaining away of her property and custody
authorizes courts to make equitable distributions of property and provide alimony. N.D. CENT. CODE §
14-05-24 (1991).
107. Crawford, 524 N.W.2d at 836.
108. Id. (citing Clooten v. Clooten, 520 N.w.2d 843 (N.D. 1994)); see Fleck v. Fleck, 337
N.W.2d 786, 789 (N.D. 1983) (stating that the function of the court is limited to determining if the trial
court abused its discretion in finding insufficient grounds for disturbing a final judgment); First Nat'l
Bank v. Bjorgen, 389 N.W.2d 789, 794 (N.D. 1986) (denying motion for relief under Rule 60(b)(vi)
when partial summary judgment was entered less than ten days after granting of creditor's motion to
amend complaint on the grounds that creditor improperly proceeded on note without first foreclosing
real estate mortgage).
109. Crawford, 524 N.W.2d at 837.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 836-37.
113. Id. at 837.
114. Id. at 836-37; see Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (stating that it is no less
important for a child to be cared for by its parent when that parent is male rather than female.
Further, a father, no less than a mother, has a constitutionally protected right to the "companionship,
care, custody, and management" of "the children he has sired and raised"). See generally Bowen v.
Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 612 n.4 (1987) (stating "[tihese cases reflect appreciation of the fact that the
parent-child bond is a fundamental relationship that requires protection regardless, and perhaps
especially because, of the misfortune and caprice that inevitably beset human affairs"); Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 846-47 (1977) (acknowledging fundamental liberty
interest of parents whose child had been placed in temporary foster care).
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rights was not fundamentally fair, and thus within the scope of Rule 60
(b)(vi).
IV. IMPACT
By vacating the decision in Crawford under Rule 60(b)(vi), the
North Dakota Supreme Court expanded the definition of "extraordinary
circumstances" to include an unconscionable stipulated agreement. For
the first time in North Dakota law, the court applied an unconscionability
standard to a divorce settlement agreement, a standard which has escaped
definition even within the carefully crafted Uniform Commercial
Code. 115 In Crawford, the court has failed to clearly define an uncon-
scionable agreement and under what circumstances lower courts should
invoke Rule 60(b)(vi).116
In a vast majority of cases dealing with unconscionability, the court
has examined essential elements of unequal bargaining power, excessive
price, disclaimer of warranties, or lack of choice.11 7 In Crawford
however, the North Dakota Supreme Court has used clause six as an
all encompassing equity power, or a "safety valve" for injustice."l 8
Whether or not an unconscionable contract concerning money and
property between a husband and wife can rise to the level of an "extra-
ordinary circumstance" within the meaning of Klapprott and Acker-
mann is questionable. However, the unfair bargaining away of the
fundamental liberty interest of child custody could certainly be seen as
an "extraordinary circumstance."
At first glance, Crawford would appear to be a case of judicial
activism in a purely contractual matter. However, it was apparent to the
court that Leslie did not possess the wherewithal to bargain with Kenneth
regarding either the property or the custody of her children. 1 9  This
115. See generally U.C.C. § 2-302, cmt. 1 (1972) (stating that "the basic test is whether, in the
light of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case.
the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the
time of the making of the contract").
116. See Crawford, 524 N.W.2d 833. Perhaps the most durable dictum on the meaning of
"unconscionability" is found in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445,449 (D.C. Cir.
1965), which stated that "[u]nconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of
meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are
unreasonably favorable to the other party." See also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRAcrs § 4.28 (2d ed.
1990) (discussing further aspects of unconscionability).
117. See, e.g., Construction Assocs. v. Fargo Water Equip. Co., 446 N.W.2d 237 (N.D. 1989).
See generally Richard J. Hunter Jr., Unconscionability Revisited: A Comparative Approach, 68 N.D.
L. REV. 145 (1992) (discussing the historical development of the doctrine of unconscionability).
118. Crawford, 524 N.W.2d at 835-36. "If courts get into the business of enforcing domestic
contracts between husband and wife, they will almost certainly have to do so with an expanded view
of the doctrines of unconscionability and overreaching." R.H. Helmholz, Comment: Recurrent
Patterns of Family Law, 8 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 175,181 (1985).
119. Crawford, 524 N.W.2d at 835-36. Following remand, Leslie Crawford obtained primary
custody of her four children. Interview with Patti J. Jensen, Attorney for Leslie Crawford, in East
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prompted the court to step in and effectuate a just and fair decision
concerning property distribution and Leslie's fundamental constitutional
right of raising her children using Rule 60(b)(vi).
The North Dakota Supreme Court must continue to refine its
definition and use of Rule 60(b)(vi) in order to avoid any inconsistencies
regarding the Crawford decision in the district courts. 120 A two-step
process for the lower courts to follow is suggested. First, the courts
should determine the validity of a constitutional right or extraordinary
circumstance that exits; and second, the courts should determine the
fairness of that process in light of all of the circumstances involved in the
bargaining process.121 This two-step approach could alleviate much of
the confusion associated with the application of Rule 60(b)(vi) in a
stipulated divorce agreement.
Lou McPhail
Grand Forks, Minn. (Sept. 10, 1995).
120. E.g., Weber v. Weber, 548 N.W.2d 781, 783 (N.D. 1996) (holding that the district court
apparently misinterpreted Crawford to apply only when there exists a relationship of trust between the
parties as they prepare to divorce).
121. For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has established three requirements for the deter-
mination that a pre- or post-nuptial agreement is equitable: "each spouse has made fair and reason-
able disclosure to the other of his or her financial status; each spouse has entered into the agreement
voluntarily and freely; and the substantive provisions of the agreement dividing the property upon
divorce are fair to each spouse." Button v. Button, 388 N.W.2d 546, 548 (Wis. 1986) (concluding that
a marital agreement was inequitable under Wts. STAT. § 767.255(11)). Furthermore, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has also employed the following four factors for determining whether each spouse had
fair and meaningful choice during contracting: "whether each party was represented by independent
counsel, whether each party had adequate time to review the agreement, whether the parties under-
stood the terms of the agreement and their effect, and whether the parties understood their financial
rights in the absence of an agreement." Id. at 551. An analogous reasoning process could be
developed in North Dakota.
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